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Abstract
The paper analyzes the e¤ects of career concerns of portfolio managers
on their incentives to trade in a order-driven market. We show that career
concerns lead portfolio managers to trade even whithout valuable informa-
tion, and hence even when they expect a negative return from trading. We
then analyze how managers reacts to changes in asset volatility and nd that
uninformed managers facing career concerns trade larger quantities as asset
riskiness increases. As a testable empirical implication, the model predicts
that increasing levels of institutional ownership in nancial markets lead to
higher trading volumes that are positively correlated with asset volatility.
1 Introduction
Most of the standard models in the asset pricing literature assign no role to nancial
institutions. In these models, it is typically assumed that individuals invest their
savings directly into stock exchanges, while nancial institutions are regarded as a veil
between investors and rms with no real e¤ect on market outcomes. However, casual
information suggests that nancial institutions are assuming increasing importance
in modern nancial markets and that very often these institutions are guided by
incentives that are not fully considered in the standard models of asset pricing.1
This paper analyzes the e¤ects of career concerns on the trading strategies of
fund managers. The industry of asset management has experienced a remarkable
1For a convincing argument in favour of a natural extension of asset pricing models to take into
account the role of nancial institutions, see Allen (2001).
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expansion in the past few decades, and managed funds have arguably become the
main vehicle channelling investors savings into stock exchanges.2 Thus, it seems
natural to conjecture that the behavior of fund managers is likely to a¤ect the features
of the nancial markets in which they operate. Though fund managersbehavior is
certainly driven by the explicit incentives provided by delegation contacts, implicit
incentives arising from career or reputation concerns are equally crucial, as witnessed
by the broad literature on the subject (Trueman (1988), Chevalier and Ellison (1997,
1999), Hu et al. (2009), Dasgupta and Prat (2006, 2008), Malliaris and Yan (2009)).3
Building on a market microstructure model proposed by Biais and Rochet (1997),
we develop a two-round model of asset delegation where fund managers di¤er in
their abilities to obtain valuable information. Fund managers are risk-neutral and
the delegation contract features a xed fee plus a performace-related component.
Career concerns arise as investors use past performance to infer managersabilities
and dismiss those managers whose performance suggests low ability. Introducing
asset delegation and career concerns into a market microstructure model allows me
to examine the e¤ects of career concerns on the trading strategies of fund managers
under di¤erent level of asset riskiness and the impact that managersstrategies have
on the overall volume of trade. In particular, the analysis leads to the following main
ndings:
1) Career concerns lead portfolio managers to trade even without information,
that is, even when the expected return from trading is negative. This result follows
from the fact that informed managers always trade in order to exploit their informa-
tion. Thus, the absence of trading suggests that the manager is unskilled, leading to
his certain termination. On the contrary, trading without information entails that
with some positive probability the uninformed managers choice is correct ex-post.
In particular, the trading strategy that maximizes this probability is that of placing
orders that are consistent with the optimal strategy of the informed managers. As
long as the performance-related component of the delegation contract is relatively
2In the U.S., mutual fund holdings of corporate equities have increased from $2.9 billion in 1950
to $2,005 billion in 2002 (NYSE Figures&Facts, 2005). From just 1999 to 2005, the number of U.S.
households investing in stock mutual funds increased by 9.3 million. By the end of 2005, 90% of all
equity-owning households were reported to hold stock mutual funds (ICI and SIA, 2005).
3Career or reputation concerns refer to the managers concern about the impact that performance
has on the likelihood of his termination/promotion as well as on his future compensation. In the
case of mutual funds, it is worthwhile to notice that though the typical delegation contract of a
manager does not include a perfomance-incentive fee, an implicit performance-based compensation
arises from the fact that net investment ow into mutual funds varies in a convex fashion as a
function of recent performance, and mutual fund managers typically receive a xed fraction of the
value of the assets under management (see Chevalier and Ellison (1997)).
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small compared to the xed component, an uninformed manager is willing to trade-
o¤ the negative return from trading with the benets that this trading might bring
about in terms of enhancing the probability of being retained.
2) Career concerns lead to an increase in the expected volume of trade. Since
trading with no information has an expected negative return, an uninformed manager
never trades in the absence of career concerns. On the contrary, informed managers
always trade according to the same trading strategy, independently from the presence
of career concerns. Thus, career concerns lead to an increase in the overall expected
volume of trade through the contribution of uninformed managerschurning.
3) As the volatility of the asset increases, uninformed managers trade larger
quantities. This result follows from the fact that the in equilibrium the strategy of
an informed manager is monotonically increasing in the value of the asset. Thus,
when asset volatility increases and extreme realizations of the asset values become
more likely, it is also more likely that a good manager will place larger orders. Since
the uninformed manager mimics the strategy of the informed manager, he will also
place larger orders as asset volatility increases.
4) Since under risk neutrality the trading strategy of informed fund managers is
not a¤ected by changes in asset volatility, an empirical implication of the previous
result is that in the presence of career concerns the expected volume of trade is
positively correlated with asset riskiness.
Our paper is closely related to the works of Trueman (1988) and Dasgupta and
Prat (2006), who both develop models of asset delegation where career concerns
induce managers to trade even when uninformed. While Trueman carries out the
analysis within a partial equilibrium framework, Dasgupta and Prat model the -
nancial market as a quote-driven market in the spirit of Glosten and Milgrom (1985).
The general equilibrium approach taken by Dasgupta and Prat allows them to fully
characterize the conditions for delegation and analyze the feedback that churning
has on equilibrium prices and volume, showing that trade by uninformed managers
leads to non-fully informative prices and high trade volume.
Our model extends Dasgupta and Prats (2006) result to an alternative trading
mechanism, namely an order-driven market that operates as a call auction, with fund
managers able to buy or sell any desired amount of the risky asset at the market-
clearing price set by the market maker.4 Most importantly, the specic modelling
4The last decade has witnessed a series of upheavals in the methods exchanges are organized,
with many markets moving from dealership systems to auction (or hybrid) systems. In October
1997, following demands from the Securities and Investments Board (in turn due to lobbying from
the institutional users of the trading systems), the London Stock Exchange changed its trading
system in the most liquid securities from a dealership system (SEAQ) to an auction system of
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choice adopted allows us to investigate the relationship between trade volume and
asset volatility, an issue that cannot be addressed in Dasgupta and Prats model,
where managers are restricted to trade only one unit of the asset. Truman (1988)
nds a positive relation between the probability that an uninformed manager engages
in trade and asset volatility. However, his partial equilibrium framework prevents
him to discuss the impact on trade volume.
The distorted e¤ects of reputation on the portfolio choices of fund managers
are also considered by Huberman and Kandel (1993). They present an adverse
selection model where a managers objective is the sum of the expected investment
outcome plus an (expected) reward entailed by the markets inference regarding the
managers ability. Fund managers have to decide which fraction of the portfolio
will be invested in a risky asset and make use of the portfolio weights to signal
their ability. Huberman and Kandel show that there exists a unique separating
equilibrium in which good managers distort their rst best investment decision in
order to distinguish themselves from bad managers. The distortion can be both in
the direction of an overinvestment or of an under-investment in the risky asset. Thus,
the model seems to better explain excessive risk taking rather that excessive trading.
Furthermore, they frame the analysis in a partial equilibrium setup.
Huddart (1999) extends Huberman and Kandel (1993) to a set-up in which the
reward to reputation is endogenous and both advisors and investors are risk-averse.
The general conclusion is that either an increase in the degree of risk aversion by
the advisor or in the fee makes separation easier to support. Notice that Huddart
retains the partial equilibrium approach and the related limitations of Truemans
and Huberman-Kandels analysis.
Finally, the present contribution bear some relation to the nancial literature
on the "trade volume puzzle." In standard models of trade with rational agents,
individuals trade because of information advantages or because they have been hit
by an exogenous shock that forces them to trade (or both). This latter type of trading
limit orders (SETS). London is not alone in changing its trading system. In 1997, the Deutsche
Bourse adopted the Xetra electronic order book system. In 2001, the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon,
LIFFE and Paris stock exchanges merged to form Euronext, a pan-European exchange, using a
single order-driven trading platform based on the French NSC electronic order book system. And
NASDAQ, the US technology stock exchange, set up a pan-European technology exchange in 2002
based on the SuperMontage trading platform, a fully integrated central limit order book and quote-
driven montage facility and execution system. Most of the on-going debate about dealer systems vs
auction systems are in large part attributable to these innovations in trading protocols. In general,
theory suggests that multilateral trading systems (such as single-price call auctions) are e¢ cient
mechanisms to aggregate diverse information. Consequently, there is interest in how call auctions
operate and whether such systems can be used more widely to trade securities.
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has been named "noise trading" or "uninformed trading" exactly because it is not
driven by any information about the underlying asset that is traded. On strictly
theoretical terms, in any model with rational traders, the presence of noise trading
is a necessary condition for trading based on information, which would otherwise
conict with the no-trade theorem. The classical justication given by the literature
for the presence of noise trade are represented by unexpected liquidity shocks and
hedging needs. At an empirical level, there is broad agreement about the fact that
only a small fraction of the total volume of trade takes place either for liquidity or
hedging purposes. Thus, in keeping with classical explanations, the remaining volume
of trade should be due to information. However, it seems highly implausible that a
small amount of noise trade can support the remaining large fraction of informative
trade.5 ;6
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I introduce delegation in the
static framework taken from Bias and Rochet (1997) and characterize the equilibrium
strategies of investors, fund managers and market makers. In section 3, I extend
the analysis to a two-period dynamic setup and compare the equilibrium in which
fund managers have career concerns with the equilibrium in which career concerns
are absent. In section 4, I analyze how the presence of career concerns a¤ects the
trading behavior of fund managers in contexts characterized by di¤erent degrees of
asset volatility. In section 5, I draw conclusions and discuss the results of the paper.
2 The basic model
In this section, I will rst present the way in which the nancial market for the risky
asset is modelled. Basically, the structure of the market is taken from Rochet and
Vila (1994). This is a discrete and static variant of Kyle (1985) in which a perfectly
informed trader (the insider) trades along with noise traders and market makers, but
both the distributions of the liquidation value of the risky asset and of noise trade
are assumed to be discrete. I will take this structure and introduce the delegation
process between investors and mutual funds. In the next section, I will consider a
dynamic version of the model and reputation issues will be introduced as well.
5Hence, the appeal to theories based on the irrationality (or limited rationality) of investors.
6Dow and Gorton (1997) present a static (one-round-of-trade) model with complete contracts in
which fund managerschurning does not originate from career concerns but as a consequence of the
optimal contract that is implemented in order to screen good managers from uninformed ones. The
optimal contract is designed such that, in equilibrium, only good managers trade. In fact, however,
sometimes good managers engage in churning.
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2.1 Structure of the market
Consider the nancial market for a risky asset. Denote with v the liquidation value




There are four classes of agents: noise traders, fund managers, investors and
market makers. For simplicity, they are all assumed to be risk neutral.
Noise traders. I denote with u the total order from noise traders and assume
that u can take on values 1 and  1 with equal probability 1
2
.7 Furthermore, u and
v are assume to be independently distributed.
Fund managers. I assume that there is a large population of fund managers.
There are two types of fund managers in the population, indexed with i = fg; bg.
Types g are perfectly informed about the true liquidation value of the risky asset,
while types b are completely uninformed. I assume that a fund manager knows his
own type and that this is private information. It is instead common knowledge that
Pr(i = g) = . If a fund manager is hired, he decides the order x 2 R to trade.
Investors. Investors are completely uninformed about the true liquidation value
of the asset and cannot invest directly.8 An investor is given the choice either to
refrain from trading or to delegate trade to a fund manager.
Market makers. Finally, there is a large population of market makers who
compete à la Bertrand to set the price p at which the asset is traded. Market makers
observe only the aggregate market order z = x + u and not the single orders x and
u. Based on the observation of z, the market maker sets the price p at which trade
takes place. The assumption of competition à la Bertrand coupled with that of risk
neutrality implies that each market maker will set a semi-strong e¢ cient price:
p = E(vjz = x+ u) (1)
Basically, (1) implies that market makers get zero prots in expectation, reecting
competition à la Bertrand.
All previous agents are assumed to be risk neutral.
The delegation contract. I assume that if an investor chooses to delegate
trade, he hires the manager according to the following exogenously specied linear
contract. Denote with R(x) = x(v   p) the return that a fund manager delivers
7A negative order is to be interpreted as a supply of the asset.
8This is done for simplicity and is without loss of generality Giving the investor the possibility
of trading directly does not alter our results. Indeed, since the investor is assumed to be completely
uninformed, the choice of investing directly produces zero payo¤s in expectation, that is the same
expected payo¤ obtained by refraining from trading.
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by trading quantity x when the liquidation value of the asset is v and the price set
by the market maker is p. Then, the fund manager gets the fraction  2 (0; 1) of
the return delivered plus a xed fee  > 0: Both  and  are exogenous (i.e. they
are parameters of the game). Basically, a fund manager trading x gets R(x) + ,
while the investor who has hired him gets (1   )R(x)   .9 There are a couple of
considerations that are worth to be done.
First, in the present setup, the linear contract under consideration does not rep-
resent a performance-related compensation scheme. Performance-related fees refers
to relative performance, that is, they are fees that the manager receives (pays) for
over-performing (under-performing) a given benchmark. They do not refer to ab-
solute performance, which is instead the case of the linear contract R(x) +  at
hand. In fact, this linear contract (with  > 0) represents pretty well the form of
payment used by large in the industry. Indeed, most of the mutual funds charge a
fee that is given by a xed percentage of the total amount of money under manage-
ment. Now, let this percentage be  . Then, if the total funds initially received by
the manager are equal to F , after management they will be equal to F (1+ r), where
r is the percentage return delivered by the manager. Accordingly, the payment from
the investor to the manager is equal to F (1 + r) = F + Fr, from which it is
clear that there is a xed payment ( F ) plus a payment that is related to absolute
performance (Fr).
Second, in the dynamic extension of the basic model presented here, the xed
component  plays a key role in determining the result that bad managers trade
with positive probability when career concerns are at play. Indeed, career concerns
are represented by the concern of a manager of being red and giving up future
prots. As it will be clear later, in the present model  represents the only source
of future prots for a bad managers. In other words, while the retaining decision of
the investor represents the implicit incentive related to having a good reputation, 
is the explicit incentive that makes reputation e¤ects be e¤ective.
Timing. At the beginning of the trading session, the following events take place.
First, an investor is randomly selected from the pool of all investors and given the
choice of refraining from trading or hiring a fund manager. If the fund manager is
hired, he observes his own type and then chooses the quantity x he desires to trade
on behalf of the investor: At the same time, noise trade u realizes. The fund manager
does not observe the realization of u. Once orders x and u have been formed, they
are submitted to the market maker who sets the price according to (1) and trade
takes place. At the end of the trading session, the true liquidation value of the asset
is realized and payo¤s are distributed. Of course, payo¤s depend on the terms of the
9Notice that noise traders get n = u(v   p), while market makers mm =  z(v   p).
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delegation contract between the investor and the manager.
2.2 Equilibrium analysis
In the absence of career concerns, a set of equilibria is described by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Given the previous assumptions and market structure, for any pair
(; ) such that  2 (0; 1) and  2  0; 3
4
(1  ) there exists an uncountable family






i) An investor always hires a fund manager





when v = 2
when v = 1
; Xg;q( v) =  Xg;q(v) (2)
Xb;q = 0 (3)
iii) The pricing strategy of market makers is such that for the set of equilibrium








when z = 1
when z = q
when z = 2  q
when z = 2 + q
; P q ( z) =  P q (z) (4)






8z 2 [0; 1] ; Pq( z) =  Pq(z) (5)
The formal proof of proposition 1 can be found in appendix A. The intuition of the
previous result is straightforward. Due to the presence of noise trade, prices do not
fully reect private information. Hence, good managers with complete information
trade whenever they are hired by an investor. Being aware of the fact that with
positive probability an informed manager is active in the market, market makers set
semi-strong e¢ cient prices to protect themselves from the presence of asymmetric
information. Consequently, a manager with no information always expects a negative
return on his trade and thus never trades. Since bad managers do not trade while
good managers always trade and do it under complete information, on average the
return delivered by a manager is positive. Under the linear delegation contract
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described above, the investor enjoys the fraction (1  ) of this average return, while
paying a xed fee equal to  for delegating trade to a manager. Since an investor
has the option of staying out of the market, he will delegate trade if and only if the
expected payo¤ of delegation is positive. In the equilibria identied by proposition
1, the average return of the mutual fund industry is equal to 3
4
. Thus, as long as
 < 3
4
(1  ), the cost of hiring a manager is lower that its benets and delegation
always takes place.
The bounds on q guarantee that the optimal trading strategy of the good manager
is strictly monotonic with respect to his signal and "non-perverse", that is, the good
manager buys when observing positive values of the asset and sells when observing
negative values. Notice that these two properties would in general be guaranteed
by simply imposing that 0 < q < 1. In fact, the stricter condition required by
proposition 1 comes from the incentive compatible constraints of the good manager
and thus also guarantees that the good manager has not any incentive to deviate
from the prescribed equilibrium strategy.10 There is a simple intuition for why q
must be not too small. In equilibrium, the scale of tradedoes not a¤ect prices in
this model: changing q does not change the prices at which orders 1 q and 1+q are
respectively liquidated. However, choosing 1+ q will lead on average to higher prices
than choosing 1 q. When informed managers observe that the asset is worth 2, they
might be tempted to trade 1  q in order to induce a lower price and make a higher
prot on each unit of the asset. To avoid this occurrence, q must be high enough to
make 1 + q su¢ ciently large so as to o¤set the lower margin that informed mangers
make on each unit when trading 1  q. The same logic applies to explain why q must
be not too high. Given the price schedule for out of equilibrium aggregate orders,
the good manager could be tempted to place very small orders to induce low prices.
Since changing q does not change the prices at which orders 1  q are liquidated, the
size of any order 1  q must be large enough to guarantee that equilibrium prots be
su¢ ciently high to make such deviations not appealing.
It is useful to remind that proposition 1 identies a family of perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the static game described above. First of all, the specication of the out
of equilibrium beliefs and of the consequent out of equilibrium price function is crucial
in determining the bounds of q within which the class of equilibria of proposition
1 is dened.11 Furthermore, proposition 1 focuses on good managers"symmetric"
10See conditions (26) and (32) in the proof of proposition 1
11It can be shown that there always exists a continuous price function that prevents the good

















is also the largest set of values that q can in principle assume in an
equilibrium where the good manager trade according to Xg (proof available under request).
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strategies, that is, strategies represented by (2). If not explicitly specied, in what
follows I will focus only on perfect Bayesian equilibria with symmetric strategies for
good managers. This keeps the analysis more tractable without losing anything from
a qualitative point of view.12
3 A Dynamic framework
Let me consider the simplest dynamic extension of the basic model analyzed in
the previous section. I will assume that the risky asset can now be traded in two
sequential rounds of trade s = 1; 2. At the end of each round, the asset pays some
dividends, which I denote with v1 and v2 respectively. For simplicity, I assume that v1
can take on values  2; 1; 1; 2 with equal probability 1
4
and that v1 and v2 are i:i:d.13
In each round of trade, noise trade can take on values  1; 1 with equal probability
1
2
. Let u1and u2 denote respectively noise trade at s = 1 and 2 and assume that u1
and u2 are i:i:d. Furthermore, u1, u2, v1 and v2 are assumed to be independently
distributed.
In each round of trade s = 1; 2, the trading protocol is the same as that described
for the static model presented in the previous section. A fund manager active at
round s observes his own type and accordingly chooses the quantity xs to trade on
behalf of the investor who has hired him. At the same time, noise trade us realizes
(the active manager does not observe the realization of us). Then, orders xs and us
are submitted to a market maker who observes only the aggregate order zs = xs+us
and accordingly sets a semi-strong e¢ cient price ps = E(vsjzs).14 At the end of each
round of trade s = 1; 2, dividends vs realize.
I assume that at the beginning of the rst round of trade, an investor is randomly
drawn from the pool of all investors and given the choice to delegate trade to a
fund manager or to stay out of the market. The delegation contract is exogenously
12See appendix A for more details about equilibria where good managers use "non-symmetric"
strategies.
13The idea is that between period 1 and 2 there occurs an event unpredictable at the beginning
of period 1 and relevant for the nancial situation of the company that issued the asset.
14In a dynamic model with more than two periods, say s = 1; 2; :::T , it is important to specify
what the market maker can observe (on top of vs) before setting prices at s + 1. Indeed, the way
the market maker sets prices in a given round of trade, say s+ 1, depends on his belief about the
quality of the manager trading at s+ 1. And this belief is formed based on all the information the
manager has collected up to s+1. This assumption is not necessary in a two-period model. Indeed,
as we will see soon, the equilibrium is such that only good managers do trade in the second and
last period. Therefore, the market maker knows that the manager active in the last round of trade
is good (notice that, in fact, the market does not close because of the presence of noise trade u).
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specied and given by the linear contract described in the previous section. In order
to evaluate the e¤ects produced by the presence of career concerns, I will compare two
di¤erent contractual setups. In the rst setup, the linear delegation contract that is
signed at the beginning of s = 1 lasts until the end of s = 2 (long-term contracting).
It is apparent that under this contractual arrangement, there is no scope for career
concerns since the manager hired at the beginning of the rst round of trade is sure to
remain in charge in the second round as well.15 In the second setup, the delegation
contract is assumed to last for only one round of trade (short-term contracting).
Furthermore, it is assumed that at the end of s = 1, the investor observes the action
taken by the incumbent manager, compares it with the realized value of the dividend
and consequently chooses wether to retain the incumbent manager or re him.16 If
the incumbent manager is retained, he keeps his own type.17 If instead the incumbent
manager is red, the investor can further choose either to hire a new manager by
drawing him from the existing pool of managers or to stay out of the market.
For simplicity, I assume that there is no discounting.
3.1 No career concerns
Assume that the linear delegation contract that is possibly signed between an investor
and a fund manager at the beginning of s = 1 lasts until the end of s = 2 (long-
term contracting). In particular, in each round of trade the investor agrees to pay
the manager a xed fee  > 0 plus a fraction  2 (0; 1) of the return delivered by
the manager. The following proposition characterizes a family of perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the dynamic game described above in the case of long-term contracting.
15Alternatively, career concerns could have been eliminated by assuming that the decision of an
investor to retain or to re a manager is not a¤ected by managers performance in the rst round,
but depends on some other exogenously unspecied reasons. For example, by assuming that the
incumbent manager is retained with an exogenous probability equal to  2 [0; 1] (see Dasgupta and
Prat 2006).
16Remember that at the end of s = 1, v1 is realized and observed by all market participants.
Investors can then compare it with the performance delivered by their manager and accordingly
form a belief about the quality of the manager. As we will see, I will formally model this updating
process by letting investors compare v1 with the order x1 submitted by the manager, rather than
with his performance. In fact, if we assume that investors can also observe the price that has been
paid/recieved by the manager, in equilibrium there is a one-to-one relation between performance
and trade order.
17The rationale behind this assumption is that if a fund manager is well informed about a given
company, then he is likely to receive valuable information whenever a new relevant event that a¤ects
the company occurs (remember that in the present model there is only one asset). Clearly, this
is not without loss of generality. One could easily pick transition probabilitieson the managers
type to reverse or invalidate career concerns altogether.
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Proposition 2 Under long-term contracting, for any pair (; ) such that  2 (0; 1)
and  2  0; 3
4
(1  ) there exists an uncountable family of perfect Bayesian equi-





such that delegation takes place and in each round of
trade s = 1; 2, managers and market makers behave as prescribed by proposition 1
I will not formally prove the previous result, since it simply amounts to iteratively
apply the prove of proposition 1 by backward induction. Notice that delegation takes
as long as  is low enough to guarantee that the costs of hiring a manager through
the two rounds of trade are less than the its benets. It can be easily shown that if
the investor hires a good manager, the expected return from his trade is equal to 3
4
in each round. If instead the manager is bad, the return delivered in each round is 0.
Thus, the total return expected from an average manager hired at the beginning of







+(1  ) 0 = 3
2
 and the expected benets from delegation
(1  ) 3
2
. On the other hand, the costs of hiring a manager for the two rounds of
trade are equal to 2. Thus, as long as  < 3
4
(1  ) delegation takes place.
3.1.1 Trade volume without career concerns
Let me consider the trade volume that is expected in a nancial market where career
concerns of portfolio managers are absent. In each round of trade, the volume of
trade expected from noise traders amounts to 1:








Thus, the total volume of trade coming from noise traders is equal to 2. Let me
now consider the expected contribution of fund managers in the two rounds of trade.
Based on managersequilibrium strategies outlined in proposition 2, we can easily
compute:
E(V i1 + V
i




2 ji = G) + (1  )E(V i1 + V i2 ji = B) = 2
where the result comes from the fact that:
E(V i1 + V
i













E(V i1 + V
i
2 ji = B) = 2(1  )0 = 0
Accordingly, the aggregate volume of trade that is expected to take place in the
market reads:
E(V1 + V2) = 2 + 2 (6)
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3.2 Career concerns
Consider now the case in which the delegation contract lasts for only one round of
trade (short-term contracting). Furthermore, assume that at the end of the rst
round of trade, the investor can decide whether to retain the incumbent manager or
re him and possibly hire a new one.
Loosely speaking, the investor makes this decision evaluating the behavior of the
incumbent manager in the rst round of trade: if at the eyes of the investor the
manager has done a good job, he will be retained; if his performance is judged to be
poorer than that of an average manager, he is red and possibly substituted with a
new manager.
Formally, I assume that at the end of s = 1, the investor can observe both the
realized value of the dividend, v1 and the trade choice of the incumbent manager,
x1. Hence, given these observations and the equilibrium strategies of good and bad
managers, the investor forms a belief that the incumbent manager is good. Let me
denote with b this belief, with
b = Pr(i = gjv1; x1)
Since at the end of s = 1 the investor has the option of replacing the incumbent
manager with a new manager (who has probability  of being good), the incumbent
will be retained if and only if b > , that is, if and only if according to the investor he
is more likely to be good than an average manager18 Thus, as long as staying in the
market for an additional round of trade turns out to be appealing to a manager, this
decisional process of the investor creates career concerns on the part of managers.
Indeed, any manager trading in the rst round is aware of the fact that his trade
choice will a¤ect his probability of being retained; accordingly, he will be more
inclined to make those trade choices that are likely to increase the probability of
being retained. As we will see, in the case of bad managers, these choices are not
optimal.
In our simplied world, good managers have complete information about the true
liquidation value of the asset. This implies that good managers expect a positive
return from trading and thus always trade. Furthermore, complete information also
implies that they always make the correct choice when trading and accordingly are
always retained with probability 1 (we could state that in fact good managers do not
face career concerns. On the other hand, bad managers are completely uninformed
about the true liquidation value of the asset. Thus, the return that they expect
18It is important to stress that this decisional rule is endogenously determined in equilibrium.
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on trade is always negative and the optimal choice would be that of not trading.
However, since good managers always trade, the absence of trade would immediately
signal to the investor the fact that the manager is bad and imply hat the manager
is red with probability 1. Therefore, the only chance that a bad manager has to
be retained is that of engaging in uninformative trade in the hope of striking a good
performance and being perceived as good by the investor.
Notice that a bad manager will in fact engage in uninformative trade if and only
if the option of staying in the market for an additional round of trade turns out to
be su¢ ciently attractive. In the second and last round of trade there is no scope for
career concerns and therefore bad managers never trade. Accordingly, the prots of
a bad manager in the second round of trade amount to the xed fee . Hence, a
bad manager who is active in the rst round has to trade o¤ the negative expected
return Reb(x) of his uninformative trade with the expected benets that this trade
might bring about in terms of enhancing the probability of enjoying future prots .
It is then clear that career concerns lead to (non-optimal) uninformative trade only
for a set of (short-term) delegation contracts characterized by values of  relatively
small to those of .
In the following proposition, I formally characterize a family of perfect Bayesian
equilibria in which delegation takes place as a rational choice of investors and bad
managers trade without information in the rst round as a consequence of career
concerns.
Proposition 3 Assume short-term contracting. Assume further that at the end of
s = 1 the investor can re the incumbent manager and substitute him with a new







5(2 ) ; (1  )34

, the two-round trade game described above admits an uncountable






i) delegation takes place in both rounds of trade. At the end of the rst round,
the investor retains the incumbent manager if and only if
b >  (7)
where b = Pr(i = gjv1; x1), otherwise he res him and hires a new manager.





when vs = 2
when vs = 1
Xs;g;q( vs) =  Xs;g;q(v2)
, s = 1; 2 (8)
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iii) bad managers do not trade in the second round, while they do trade in the










iv) In the rst round, the price strategy of market makers is such that for the set








when z1 = 2 + q
when z1 = 2  q
when z1 = q
P 1;q( z1) =  P 1;q(z1)
(10)









when z2 = 1
when z2 = q
when z2 = 2  q
when z2 = 2 + q
P 2;q( z2) =  P 2;q(z2)
(11)
In both rounds of trade market makers reacts to out-of-equilibrium aggregate orders






8zs 2 [0; 1]
Ps;q( zs) =  P 1;q(zs)
, s = 1; 2 (12)
The formal proof of proposition can be found in appendix A. Good managers
have complete information. Their buying and selling strategy is always optimal and
makes them sure that they will be retained with probability 1. Accordingly, their
trading strategy is not a¤ected by career concerns and indeed is invariant across
the two rounds and is exactly the same strategy described in propositions 2 and 1
for the case of no career concerns. Thus, the intuition behind the strategy of good
managers and the relative bounds on q is exactly the one given in the discussion of
proposition 1. For bad managers, things do in fact change with respect to the case
of no career concerns. Their trading behavior is strongly conditioned by the concern
of being red. Since bad managers are completely uninformed, the optimal thing to
do for them should be that of not trading. In fact, in the second round, where there
15
is no scope for career concerns, they optimally refrain from trading. However, in the
rst round they know that the absence of trade would immediately signal their bad
type, leading to their dismission. Career concerns pushes them to trade even in the
presence of a negative expected return due to the absence of information. The upper
bound on  and the lower bound on  make sure that the negative expected return
Reb(x) of their uninformative trade is low enough, while future prots  are high
enough to make it appealing to the bad manager to engage in uninformative trade
in the hope of being retained. Bad managersequilibrium strategy X1;b amounts to
mimicking the good manager by randomly placing intermediate orders 1 q or 1+q,
in the hope that the chosen order reveals correct ex-post, inducing the investor to
perceive the manager as good. Notice that strategy X1;b maximizes the probability
of being retained, while minimizing the expected losses from trade. Indeed, placing
either order 1+ q or  1  q leads to same probability 1
4
that the manager is retained
as X1;b. However, the (negative) return R
e
b(x) expected by the bad manager is
increasing in the order size. Thus, intermediate orders are preferred to large ones.
Notice that the return that good managers expect in the rst round is higher than
the one they expect in the second round. These expected returns read respectively:
E (R1;g) = 1  
4 (2  ) + q










Since  2 (0; 1) and q is positive, E (R1;g) is always greater than E (R2;g). This
result is not surprising if we consider that the uninformative trade of bad managers
in the rst round increases the level of noise present in the market and consequently
allows good managers to strike better prices. In line with his interpreation, E (R1;g)
is decreasing in the probability  of being a good manager: clearly, the higher the
fraction of good managers in the population, the smaller that of traders who lose to




E (R1;g) = E (R2;g)
As  approaches 1, market makers post higher prices and E (R1;g) decreases to
E (R2;g) which is indeed the return that good managers expects in the second round,
when bad managers do not trade. By proposition 2, we can easily compute that in
the absence of career concerns E (R1;g) = E (R2;g) = 34 . Thus, good managers enjoys
the ine¢ cient behavior of bad managersuninformative trade brought in by career
concerns. It is important to stress that this result is the consequence of market mak-
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ers reacting more harshly in the framework with no career concerns. Thus, a possible
implication of the analysis is that prices are less volatile when a sizable fraction of
traders bear career concerns.
Delegation takes always place because the upper bound on  makes sure that in
every round of trade the cost of hiring a manager is less than the expected benets
of delegation. The expected benets of delegation are strictly positive thanks to
the presence of good managers who trade under complete information. It is easy













Clearly, these returns are increasing in the probability  that a good manager is
selected to trade. It is interesting to notice that average returns from delegation do
not depend on the size of trade q. Furthermore, ER2 > ER1. This is seemingly
surprising if we consider that in the second round bad managers behave optimally
(by not trading), while they engage in uninformative trade in the rst round. The
reason why ER2 > ER1 has to be found in the higher return that good managers can
deliver in the rst round thanks to the higher level of noise. The positive e¤ect that
better prices have on the return of good managers more than o¤sets the negative
impact that bad managerstrade has on rst-round average return. Notice further
that the average return on delegation is always positive, no matter how big is the
fraction of bad manager (as  ! 0, it approaches zero). This is seemingly surprising
and depends on the fact that prices respond endogenously to the level of information
present in the market. Thus, the higher the fraction of bad manager, the lower
the prices set on average by market makers and the lower the loss su¤erred by
bad managers. At the limit, when  ! 0, market makers know that there is no
information in the market and set the price of the asset equal to its expected value,
thai is zero and the loss of bad managers is reduced to zero.
A word of caution is needed with respect to the generality of the previous two
results. First of all, the model assumes that good managers are the only informed
traders present in the market. Thus, they enjoy all the increase in noise.19 If there
19This result suggests that in a dynamic model where there is only one insider who does not always
have private information, but rather is informed with probability  in each period, the optimal
strategy of the insider could possibly be that of trading also when he does not have information in
order to increase the level of noise and enjoy higher returns in periods when he does have information
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were other informed traders, these benets should be shared among more traders
and the increase in good managers return would be lower as well as the average
return on delegation, which could possibly become negative. Second, the result of
a higher average return on delegation is achieved also because in the specic model
at hand, bad managersuninformative trade is designed as to minimize the negative
return that bad managers expect (randomizing over 1   q and  1 + q rather than
on 1 + q and  1  q). As we will see in the next section, this is not always the case.
Finally, rember that we are assuming investorsrisk neutrality. Thus, in the model
under consideration any increase i the average return on delegation is welcome by
investors. However, if investors were risk averse, then they would dislike the increase
in the variability of managersreturns that occurs with churning.
Staying to our model, it is clear that noise traders are the one who pay for the
non optimal behavior of bad managers. It is easy to check that the expected loss of
noise traders is higher under career concerns. What if we consider the change in the
aggregate return of investors and noise tarders? Focus on the rst round of trade.
Notice that since market makers xpects zero prots in equilibrium, it must be that
E (R1;u) =  E (R1)
Investors enjoys E (R1). Thus, the aggregate return of investors and noise traders
read







What is the situation in the absence of career concerns and churning?
 E (R1) + E (R1) =   (1  )E (R1) =   (1  ) 3
4





 <   (1  ) 3
4
 and thus, churning
makes the class of individuals represented by investors&noiose traders worse.
3.2.1 Trade volume with career concerns
As we did for the case in which there were no career concerns, we can compute the
total volume of trade that is expected when career concerns are relevant. As for the
model with no career concerns, the volume of trade expected from noise traders is
equal to 1 in each round of trade. Let me focus on the expected contribution of the
managers across the two rounds of trade. In the rst round of trade, both bad and
(of course, this presumably occurs when  is high enough).
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good managers trade and expected volume reads:





















=  + (1  )(1  q)
In the second and last round only good managers trade and the volume of trade
expected for in this stage reads:













+ (1  )0 = 
Hence, the volume of trade that is expected to come from managers is given by:
E(V i1 + V
i
2 ) = 2 + (1  )(1  q)
Accordingly, the total expected volume of trade is the sum of noise traderscontri-
bution and managerscontribution over the two rounds of trade, and reads:
E(V1 + V2) = 2 + 2 + (1  )(1  q) (13)
Remember that in the absence of career concerns, the expected volume of trade






it is true that 2 + 2 + (1   )(1   q) > 2 + 2. Thus, we can conclude that the
presence of career concerns leads to an increase in the expected volume of trade. The
additional volume (1  )(1  q) stems exclusively from reputation reasons. In fact,
this additional amount of trade comes all from bad managers, who do not possess
any valuable information about the liquidation value of the asset.
4 Trade volume and asset volatility
In the present section, I analyze the e¤ects of changes in asset volatily on the trading
strategies of managers concerned with their reputation. In order to investigate this
issue, consider the two-period trade game described in the previous section and allow
for a more general probability distribution of the the liquidation value of the asset
traded in the rst round v1. In particular, let Pr(v1 = 2) = Pr(v1 =  2) = w
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and Pr(v1 = 1) = Pr(v1 =  1) = 12   w, with 0 < w < 12 . Thus, E(v) = 0 and
V AR(v) = 6w + 1. It is apparent that higher values of w are associated to higher
values of the variance for the asset traded at s = 1.20
I will show that as long as  is small enough, when the variance of the asset
increases over a given threshold, bad managers increase the volume of their uninfor-
mative trade. In fact, the main result is derived under the assumption that  ! 0
and  > 0. Assuming  ! 0 allows us to focus on the e¤ects that reputation con-
cerns have on the trading strategies of managers, since in this case the performance
of the a manager does not a¤ect his payo¤ directly, but only through the probability
of being retained.
Trueman (1988) shows that the probability that bad managers churn increases
with the variance of the asset, predicting that noise trade is more likely to occur for
riskier asstes. However, his partial equilibrium framework prevents him to carefully
discuss the impact on trade volume. In the present model, the probability that bad
managers engage in uninformative trade is xed at 1  . However, the size of their
orders is found to be sensible to the volatility of the asset. In particular, when
volatility gets above a given threshold, bad managers switch their trading strategy
of randomizing over 1   q and  1 + q and start randomizing over orders 1 + q and
 1  q.
The intuition is straightforward. In equilibrium, the strategies of good managers
are strictly monotonic with respect to the value of the asset. Since good managers
are risk neutral and can perfectly observe the value of the asset, their strategies
do not depend on the probability distribution of the values of the asset.21 Bad
managers are completely uninformed about the true value of the asset. Since they
know what is the optimal equilibrium strategy of good managers, they submit those
orders compatible with the strategy of good managers that are more likely to reveal
correct ex post. A low variance of the values of the asset arises when the intermediate
values of the asset (in the present case 1 and  1) are more likely to occur than the
20Assuming a more general distribution function only for v1, while keeping the same distribution
I used in the previous sections for v2 is done for simplicity and it without loss of generality
21Since we are assuming ! 0, one may wonder why good managers should condition their order
on the value of the asset they observe. After all, when ! 0, their contract leaves them indi¤erent
to any return they may produce (they get  in any case). In fact, the incentives related to reputation
force them to behave in the interest of the investor and follow a trading strategy that maximizes
the expected return given the information they possess. Indeed, loosely speaking, the incentives
related to reputation are such that if ex post an investor realizes that the manager has adopted an
ex-ante non optimal strategy, he res him. This will formally be translated into equilibrium beliefs
by investors about the optimal trading strategy of good managers and a consistent hiring/ring
strategy.
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extreme values (in our case 2 and  2). Accordingly, from the point of view of our
bad managers, it is more likely that good managers submit either order 1   q or
 1 + q than orders 1 + q or  1   q. Therefore, being completely uninformed, bad
managers maximize their chances to be correct by randomizing over 1 q and  1+q.
High volatility is associated to extreme values of the asset that are more likely to
occur than intermediate ones. In this case, the bad managers maximizes his chances
to trade correctly by randomizing over 1 + q and  1  q, since those are the orders
that most likely will be placed by a good manager.
Since the optimal strategy of good managers is not a¤ected by the probability
distribution of the values of the asset, the aggregate volume of trade is also shown
to increase when moving fromstates of low variance to states of high variance. The
previous discussion is formalized in the next two propositions. In order to simplify
the mathematics, all results have being obtained under the assumption of  = 1
2
. It
is possible to show that from a qualitative point of view, the result of proposition
4 part a) holds for every  2 (0; 1), while the result of part b) holds as long as  is
"not too small".
Proposition 4 Let  = 1
2
and ! 0+. Then, the following occurs:
a) When 0 < w  1
4




w   3w2	, there exists






good managers, bad managers and investors behave as described by proposition 3.
In particular, in the rst period bad managers randomize with equal probability over
1  q and  1 + q.
b) When 1
4
< w < 1
2
, as long as 0 <   1+4w 12w2
4
, there exists an uncountable





in which good managers and
investors still behave as described by proposition 3, while bad managers randomize
with equal probability over 1 + q and  1   q in the rst period and do not trade in
the last one.22




2 z1 = 2 + q
1 2w
2(1 w) z1 = 2  q
6w 1
2 z1 = q




1+2w z1 = 2 + q
1 z1 = 2  q
12w 1
4 z1 = q
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The proof of this result is detailed in appendix A. Proposition 4) immediately
implies the following result.
Proposition 5 The maximum value of trade volume expected in the equilibrium with
low variance is always lower than the minimum value of trade volume expected in the
equilibrium with high variance.
Proof. Let me denote with I the family of equilibria described in part (a) of propo-
sition 4 and with II the family of equilibria described in part (b) of proposition 4.
Since the volume of trade expeted from noise traders is the same in both family of
equilibria (it sums up to 1 in each round of trade), let me focus on managerscontri-
bution. It is apparent from proposition 1 that the volume of (noise) trade expected
from bad managers in equilibrium of type I is lower than the volume of (noise) trade
expected from bad managers in equilibrium of type II.23 Furthermore, it also follows
from proposition 1 that when 0  w  1
4
and thus 1 < V AR(w)  5
2
, the expected
volume of trade reads:
































[2w(1 + q) + (1  2w) (1  q)] + 1
2
(1  q) =
= 2qw + 1  q
On the other hand, when 1
4




< V AR(w) < 4, the expected
Both in case 7a and 7b, any aggregate order z1 inconsistent with the equilibrium is met by out
of equilibrium beliefs of the market maker that give rise to the following out of equilibrium price
function:
P1(z1) =
8<: 2 z1  1; z1 6= 2  q; 2 + q2z1   1  z1  1; z1 6=  q; q 2 z1   1; z1 6=  2  q; 2 + q
23It may be interesting to compare the proportion of noise trade to that of informed trade in the
two types of equilibria.
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volume of trade reads:
































[2w(1 + q) + (1  2w) (1  q)] + 1
2
(1 + q) =
= 2qw + 1
Equilibrium multiplicity prevents us from analyzing how the expected volume of
trade varies with w within each of the two type of equilibria family I and II (indeed,
to any given admissible value of w for which an equilibria family holds it is associated
an uncountable number of equilibria indexed by q belonging to that family).
However, notice that the highest expected volume of trade in the rst family of
equilibria reads:
V eI  V eI (
1
4
; q) = 1  1
2
q
while the lowest expected volume of trade in the second family of equilibria is given
by:














, the maximum value of trade volume expected in
the equilibrium of type I is always lower than the minimum value of trade volume
expected in the equilibrium of type II.24
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In the present paper, I showed that career concerns induce uninformed fund man-
agers to indulge in excessive trading. This result has been derived in a order-driven
market for a risky asset in which investors delegate trade to di¤erently informed fund
managers concerned about being perceived as well informed. The nancial market
has been model through a discrete variant of the classic Kyle (1985), in which both
the distributions of the liquidation value of the risky asset and of noise trade are
24It is important to stress that this result does not depend on the assumption that  = 12 . Indeed,
in the more general case, volumes of trade read: V eI (w; q) = 4qw + 1  q and V eII(w; q) = 4qw +
1+q 2q. Accordingly, V eI = V eI (w = 14 ; q) = 1 q (1  ) and V eII = V eII(w ! 14 ; q) = 1+q(1 ),
from which it is apparent that V eI (w =
1




4 ; q) for every  2 (0; 1).
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assumed to be discrete. This represents an extension of Dasgupta and Prat (2006),
who showed that the same result holds in a market modelled à la Glosten and Mil-
grom (1985). The setup I used allowed me to analyze how the trading strategies of
fund managers are a¤ected by career concerns in markets characterized by di¤erent
assets volatility. I showed that high volatility is likely to induce bad managers to
increase the size of their noise trade. This is a generalization of Trueman (1988) to
a general equilibrium framework.
Conditions for delegation take place are explicitly derived. Analogously, condi-
tions for career concerns be e¤ective are characterized. In this respect, it is worth
noticing that in the present model, career concerns arise if and only if both the
two following conditions take place. First, investors have to rationally allocate their
funds to managers that are perceived as being better informed than their competi-
tors. Second, the compensation that managers receive for managing the fund has
to exhibit a xed component. In particular, this xed component should be high
enough relatively to the performance component in order to provide the manager
with the incentives to managing the fund without worrying about the return he de-
livers. Notice that these considerations are drawn under the assumption that the
contract between a manager and an investor is exogenously given. It would be in-
teresting to allow for endogenous contracting and check wether under the optimal
contract good manager would specify a xed payment low to prevent bad managers
from engaging in reputation trade (and eventually kicking them out of the market).
On the other hand, notice that all other things being equal, the return delivered
by good managers when bad managers trade is higher. This is due to the fact that
bad managerstrade is noise trade. The increase of noise in the market allows good
managers to strike better prices and thus higher returns. The analysis above has
been done under the assumption that the contract between a manager and an in-
vestor is exogenously given. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to allow
for endogenous contracting and check wether the positive e¤ects that the presence
of bad managers have on good managersprots lead them to optimally choose a
contract that does not determine separation.
It is interesting to notice that the (expected) return from delegation is indepen-
dent from the order size q, and depends only on the exogenous parameters of the
model w and  (see 72 and 66). While it is apparent that the return from delegation
is increasing in , we cannot draw a denite conclusions about the way in which it
varies with respect to w. Indeed, when w gets higher than 1
4
, there is a switch from
an equilibrium of low volume to an equilibrium of high volume. It is worth noticing
that in both equilibria, the return from delegation is maximized for w ! 1
4
, when
there is the highest degree of information asymmetry between the market maker and
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the good manager. In particular, the highest return expected in the equilibrium with
high volatility (and high volume) is lower than the highest return expected in the
equilibrium with low volatility (and low volume). This result is driven by the fact
that in the equilibrium with high volatility, bad managers trade more aggressively,
generating highest losses.
Appendix A
proof of proposition 1. I will rst consider the candidate equilibrium q whereby
the trading strategy of the good and the bad managers are given by (2) and (3)
and compute the prices that would arise for these strategies, using the property that
prices are set as conditional expectations given by (1). I will then show that for
these prices, strategies (2) and (3) do maximize the expected prots of good and bad
managers. Finally, given (2), (3), (4) and (5), I will work out the conditions under
which an investor always nds it convenient to hire a fund manager.
Let  2 (0; 1) and  > 0. Let z = Z(u; v; i) denote the aggregate order for the
asset, with i 2 fg; bg indicating managers type. In order to ease notation, from now
on I will drop subscript q from the strategies of the players and let Xq;i()  Xi()
and Pq()  P ().
The market makers problem. Amarket maker has to set the regret-free price
at which to liquidate trade, based on the observation of the aggregate demand for
the asset. Given fund managersequilibrium strategies (2) and (3), and the possible
realizations of noise trade and asset value, the equilibrium aggregate demand for the
asset is odd and satises:
Z(u; v; i) =
8>>>><>>>>:
2 + q when fu = 1; v = 2; i = gg
2  q when fu = 1; v = 1; i = gg
1 when fu = 1;8v; i = bg
q when fu =  1; v = 2; i = gg
or fu = 1; v =  1; i = gg
Z(u; v; i) =  Z( u; v; i)
Focus on positive equilibrium orders z = q; 1; 2  q; 2 + q. Each aggregate order
perfectly reveals which type of manager is in the market. When the aggregate order
is equal to 1, the market maker infers that a bad manger has been hired and thus
that the aggregate order comes all from noise traders. Accordingly, he sets:
P (1)  E(vj1) = E(v) = 0
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In all the other cases (z = q; 2   q; 2 + q), the market maker realizes that a good
manager is trading. Furthermore, when z = 2  q; 2+ q, he can perfectly recover the
information of the good manager. Accordingly, he sets:
P (2  q) = 1
P (2 + q) = 2
On the other hand, when z = q, the market maker cannot tell whether the good
manager has observed v = 2 (and u =  1) or v =  1 (and u = 1). Since the market
maker puts equal probability on these two events25, his optimal price response to
aggregate order q reads:







Since Z(u; v; i) =  Z( u; v; i), it is immediate to compute the prices that the
market maker sets in response to negative aggregate orders and show that P (q) =
 P ( q).
So far, we have shown that the price response of the market maker to equilibrium
aggregate orders (i.e., orders that are consistent with strategies (2) and (3) of good
and bad managers) is given by (4).
In order to complete the construction of the price function in the candidate equi-
librium q, we need to construct the price schedule according to which the market
maker sets prices in response to out of equilibrium aggregate orders. In this respect,
market makers out of equilibrium beliefs about information content of trade are
crucial. It is important to notice that in the present game, PBE does not imply any
restriction on market makers out of equilibrium beliefs. Thus, the market makers
price response to any out of equilibrium order can be every price belonging to [ 2; 2].
I assume the following out of equilibrium beliefs:
8z > 1; z 6= 2  a; 2 + a; Pr(v = 2jz) = 1
8z 2 [0; 1] ; z 6= a; 1; Pr(v = 2) = z + 1
2
; Pr(v =  2) = 1  z
2
8z 2 [ 1; 0] ; z 6=  a; 1; Pr(v =  2) = z + 1
2
; Pr(v = 2) =
1  z
2
8z <  1; z 6=  2 + a; 2  a; Pr(v =  2jz) = 1
25This is a consequence of the specic distributional assumptions we have made for v and u,
according to which v = 2 and v =  1 have equal probability to occur and so do u =  1 and u = 1;
with u and v independent.
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It is then immediate to show that the out of equilibrium price function is exactly
given by (5).26
Managersproblem. We have now to show that given (4) and (5), it is indeed
optimal for good and bad managers to follow strategies Xg () and Xb () respectively.
Given the symmetry of the problem (both P () and Z() are odd functions), it is
su¢ cient to focus on the analysis of the buy side of the problem, that is, on non
negative orders.
Let me dene R(x) = x(v p) as the ex-post return of a manager trading quantity
x. Since p = P (x+ u), it is useful to write R(x) = x [v   P (x+ u)] to highlight that
the ex-post return delivered by the manager depends on his order x, on the liquidation
value of the asset v and on noise u. It is then clear that ex-ante, the return that
manager i expects from placing order x depends on the information he has about v
and u. This information crucially depends on the type of manager. Let 
i denote
the information set of manager i. Formally, the expected return of manager i from
order x reads:
E (R(x)j
i) = x [E (vj
i)  E (P (x+ u)j
i)]
Notice that the expected return from order x depends on the expectation that man-
ager i holds about the value of the asset minus the expectation about the price he is
going to pay when posting order x. Since 
g = fvg and 
b = ?, we have that:
Reg (x; v)  E (R(x)jv) = x [v   E (P (x+ u))]
Reb (x)  E (R(x)) = x [ E (P (x+ u))]
26The general idea behind these out of equilibrium beliefs is that whenever the market maker is
sure that a manager has posted a positive order, he takes the harshest belief assigning probability
1 to the event that this positive (negative) order is coming from a good manager who has observed
v = 2 (v =  2). Hence, when aggregate order is greater than 1 (less than -1), the market maker
is sure that there is a manager posting a positive order (because noise trade is either 1 or -1) and
accordingly sets the harshest price p = 2 (p =  2).
If the aggregate order is between -1 and 1, the situation is more complex because the market
maker cannot tell the direction of managers trade. Consider for example the case z 2 (0; 1) (being
the case z 2 ( 1; 0) symmetric). Any aggregate order between 0 and 1 can be the result of the
following two events:
1) x 2 ]1; 2[ and u =  1
2) x 2 ] 1; 0[ and u = 1
In the rst event, the market maker would set the harshest price p =  2. In the second event,
he would set the harshest price p = 2: Since the market maker cannot distinguish this two events,
I assume that when he observes a positive aggregate order z 2 [0; 1], the probability he assigns to
event 1) is increasing in the aggregate order z. Basically, the higher the order size, the more likely
it is that it is the result of good manager demanding for the asset.
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Notice that good managers can make more accurate forecasts of returns thanks to the
fact that they are able to perfectly forecast the true value of the asset. However, they
are not better than bad manager in predicting trading prices. Since prices depends
only on x and u and no manager has some information about u, both types make the
same forecast E (P (x+ u)) about the price they are going to pay by posting order
x. To ease notation, let P e(x)  E(P (x+ u)) and accordingly write:
Reg (x; v) = x [v   P e(x)] (14)
Reb (x) =  xP e(x) (15)
Notice that since u can take on values 1 and  1 with equal probability, we have that:
P e(x)  E(P (x+ u)) = 1
2
P (x+ 1) +
1
2
P (x  1) (16)
Bad managers. Let me rst consider the case in which a bad manager is selected
to trade. Using (15), it is easy to show that under the linear contract specied in




b (x) +  =  xP e(x) +  (17)
Since the equilibrium strategy of the bad manager prescribes to refrain from
trading, his expected prots in equilibrium read eb(0) = .
In order to show that Xb = 0 is the optimal trading strategy of a bad manager,
we have to prove the following two di¤erent cases:
1) The bad manager has not any incentives in mimicking a good manager by
placing any order x 2 f1  q; 1 + qg consistent with good managers equilibrium
strategy. Formally, this amounts to prove that the following two inequalities hold:
eb(0)  eb(1 + q) (18)
eb(0)  eb (1  q) (19)
Using (17), we can write:
eb(1 + q) =   (1 + q)P e(1 + q) + 
eb (1  q) =   (1  q)P e(1  q) + 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By (16) and (4), we can easily compute:
P e(1 + q) =
1
2






P e(1  q) = 1
2
P (2  q) + 1
2
P ( q) = 1
4
Hence, conditions (18) and (19) can be nally written as follows:
   5
4
(1 + q) + 
   1
4
(1  q) + 
It is apparent that the previous inequalities are simultaneously satised for
 1  q  1 (20)
2) The bad manager has no incentives to deviate to any other positive order
inconsistent with the equilibrium. Let x 2 R+ n f1  q; 1 + qg denote an arbitrary
positive order inconsistent with the equilibrium. Formally, we have to show that









It is convenient to distinguish the following two cases:
2a) x  2. In this case, the aggregate order z = x+u is always greater than 1 for
any realization of u =  1; 1. Thus, by (5), we have that P (x + 1) = P (x   1) = 2.
Accordingly, P e(x) = 2 and our condition boils down to:
   2x+ 
which is clearly always satised in our parameters region (remember that x is posi-
tive).
2b) x 2 (0; 2) n f1  q; 1; 1 + qg : In this case, when u =  1, the aggregate order
is z = x  1 2 ( 1; 1); when u = 1, the aggregate order is z = x+ 1 > 1. Hence, by
(5), P (x  1) = 2(x  1) and P (x+ 1) = 2. Therefore, P e(x) = x and our condition
can be written as:
   x2 + 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which is clearly always satised (again, remember that x is positive).
Good managers. Let me now consider the case in which the good manager is
selected to trade. Before trading, the good manager observes the true value of the
asset v. By (14), the payo¤ that a good manager expects from placing order x when
the asset is worth v can be written as follows:
eg (x; v) = R
e
g (x; v) +  =
= x [v   P e(x)] + 
Since the symmetry of the problem allows us to focus on the buy side of the market,
I will analyze only the cases in which the good manager has observed v = 1 and
v = 2.
Expected prots of the good manager from following his equilibrium strategy
Xg (v) read:




(1  q) + 




(1 + q) + 
I will show that Xg (v) is the optimal strategy for the good manager by analyzing
the following cases:
1) When the good manager observes v = 1, he trades Xg (1) = 1   q instead of
deviating to any other order consistent with the equilibrium, i.e., 1 + q or 0. This
amount to show that the following inequalities hold:
eg (1  q; 1)  eg (1 + q; 1) (21)
eg (1  q; 1)  eg (0; 1) (22)
It is easy to check that:
eg (1 + q; 1) = (1 + q) [1  P e(1 + q)] +  =
=  1
4
(1 + q) + 
eg (0; 1) = 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so that our conditions (21) and (22) can be written as:
3
4
(1  q) +    1
4
(1 + q) + 
3
4
(1  q) +   
Both these inequalities are always satised for
q  1 (23)
2) When the good manager observes v = 2, he plays Xg (2) = 1 + q instead of
deviating to 1  q or 0: Formally, it must be that:
eg (1 + q; 2)  eg (1  q; 2) (24)
eg (1 + q; 2)  eg (0; 2) (25)
which can be written as:
3
4








(1 + q) +   
and simplied to:
3(1 + q)  7 (1  q)
(1 + q)  0




3) Following the equilibrium strategy Xg (v) gives the good manager expected
prots greater than those he would get by deviating to any positive order inconsis-
tent with the equilibrium. Let x 2 R+= f0; 1  q; 1 + qg indicate a positive order
inconsistent with the equilibrium. Then, we have to show that the two following
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conditions hold:
eg (1  q; 1)  eg (x; 1) (27)
eg (1 + q; 2)  eg (x; 2) (28)
It is useful to consider the two following cases:
3a) x  2. In this case, z = x + u > 1 for any realization of u and by (5)
P e(x) = 2. Accordingly:
eg (x; 1) = x [1  P e(x)] +  =
= x (1  2) +  =  x+ 
eg (x; 2) = x [2  P e(x)] +  =
= x (2  2) +  = 




(1  q)   x
3
4
(1 + q)  0
which are simultaneously satised under condition:
 1  q  11
3
(29)
3b) x 2 (0; 2)nf1  q; 1; 1 + qg. We have shown above that in this case P e(x) = x.
Thus, we can write:













(1  q)  x  x2 (30)
3
4
(1 + q)  2x  x2 (31)
A necessary and su¢ cient condition for the rst inequality to be satised is that
q  2
3
, while a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the second one is that q  1
3
.
Hence, (27) and (28) are both satised as long as:
1
3
 q  2
3
(32)
Summing up conditions (23), (26), (29) and (32) for the good manager, we have that










Notice that the previous condition is stricter than optimality condition (20) for the
bad manager. Thus, under (33) both good and bad managers will play equilibrium
strategies Xg (v) and X

b = 0 as optimal responses to P (z).
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The investors problem. Before trade opens, the investor has to decide
whether to delegate trade to a fund manager or stay out of the market. Suppose
the investor chooses to hire a manager. With probability  he hires a good manager.











(1 + q) [2  P e (1 + q)] + 1
4




( 1 + q) [ 1  P e ( 1 + q)] + 1
4
( 1  q) [ 2  P e ( 1  q)] = 3
4
With probability 1   he hires a bad manager. Since a bad manager does not trade
in equilibrium, the return that the investor expects for him in equilibrium is zero.
Thus, the average return from delegation expected by the investor in equilibrium is
equal to 3
4
. Given the linear contract under consideration, the expected equilibrium
27In fact, for q = 25 , the good type is indi¤erent between following strategy Xq;g() and mimicking
the bad type by playing x = 0
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If the Investor does not hire any manager, he will get a payo¤ equal to zero.
Therefore, the investor will hire a fund manager if and only if
3
4
(1  )   > 0
which is satised for any  2 (0; 1) as long as  < 3
4
(1  ).
Equilibria multiplicity. It is useful to remind that proposition 1 identies a
family of perfect Bayesian equilibria of the static game described above. In particu-
lar, proposition 1 focuses on "symmetric" strategies for the good manager, that is,
strategies represented by (2). More generally, there exist families of perfect Bayesian
equilibria indexed by the pair (q1; q2) in which investors delegate trade, bad man-




1 + q2 when v = 2
1  q1 when v = 1
 1 + q2 when v =  1
 1  q1 when v =  2
(34)
with q1; q2 taking values in appropriate subsets of the segment (0; 1). This result
can be easily proved by following the reasoning in the proof of proposition 1. At an
intuitive level, what we need is just that (at least in some cases) the good manager
be able to disguise his information behind noise trade. Notice that strategy (34)
is such that the market maker cannot distinguish (v = 2, u =  1) from (v =  1,
u = 1) and (v =  2, u = 1) from (v = 1, u =  1).
Basically, (34) is derived by considering that the optimal strategy of the good
manager must be monotonic with respect to the managers signal and must satisfy
the following camouage conditions:
Xg (2)  1 = Xg ( 1) + 1
Xg ( 2) + 1 = Xg (1)  1
In order to obtain (34), let
Xg;q(2)  1 = Xg;q( 1) + 1 = q2 2 R
Xg;q( 2) + 1 = Xg;q(1)  1 = q1 2 R
34
Optimality requires strictly monotonicity, which restricts q1 and q2 to be positive.
Optimality also implies that q1 and q2 be less than one (values of q1 and q2 greater
than one implies that the manager is selling when observing positive values of the
dividends and buying when observing negative values of the dividends, thus delivering
negative returns).28
Proof of proposition 3. The prices that the manager expects to pay in the
equilibria identied by propositio 3 read:












P e1 (1  q) =  P e2 ( 1 + q) =













(1 + q) (2  P e2 (1 + q)) = 34 (1 + q) if v2 = 2 or v2 =  2















if v1 = 2 or v1 =  2








if v2 = 1 or v2 =  1
(40)






28Another camouage case arises when:
Xg;q(2)  1 = Xg;q( 2) + 1
Xg;q( 1) + 1 = Xg;q(1)  1

















Let  2 (0; 1),  > 0 and q 2 (0; 1). I will prove proposition 3 by backward induction.
Second round of trade. Since the second round of trade is also the last one,
managers do not face career concerns. Thus, the second round of trade is equivalent
to the basic nancial market of section 2. Accordingly, investors, managers and mar-
ket makersequilibrium behavior for the second round of trade is the one described
in proposition 1: investors always hire a manager, bad managers do not trade, good
managers trade according to (2) and market makers set prices according to (4) and
(5). Furthermore, we know from proposition 1 that this behavior constitutes an







 < (1  ) 3
4
 (44)
Investors retaining rule at the end of the rst round of trade. The
equilibrium average return that the investor expects to be delivered by a bad manager
in the second round is clearly equal to zero; on the other hand, that expected from
a good manager reads:
E






































Let b = Pr(i = gjv1; x1) denote the investors believe that the incumbent manager
is good. Accordingly, the equilibrium payo¤ that the investor expects in the second




Alternatively, the equilibrium payo¤ that the investor expects in the second round





Thus, the investor retains the old manager if and only if:
(1  )3
4
b    > (1  )3
4
   
or equivalently, b > 
Notice that under condition (44), this is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for





   > 0, which ensures that the investor will in fact prefer to retain the
incumbent manager than refraining from trading (which would give him zero prots).
Investors belief b. Based on the observation of x1 and v1; the investor updates
his belief about the fact that the manager is good. Formally, the investor computes
(whenever possible) b  Pr(i = gjv1;x1), where
Pr(i = gjv1; x1) = Pr(i = g) Pr(x1jv1; i = g)
Pr(i = g) Pr(x1jv1; i = g) + Pr(i = b) Pr(x1jv1; i = b)
Let  = f 1  q; 1 + q; 1  q; 1 + qg denote the set of managersequilibrium or-
ders. Given the equilibrium strategies X1;g and X

1;b, it is easy to show that for any
x1 2 , the following holds true:
Pr(i = gjv1; x1) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
1 if (v1 = 2; x1 = 1 + q) or
(v1 =  2; x1 =  1  q)
2
1+
if (v1 = 1; x1 = 1  q) or
(v1 =  1; x1 =  1 + q)
0 if v1 2 f 2; 1; 1; 2g and
x1 6= X1;g(v1)
(45)
On the other hand, for orders o¤ the equilibrium path, Bayesian perfection imposes
no restrictions on Pr(i = gjv1;x1), which could in principle take any value in [0; 1]. I
thus assume that:
Pr(i = gjv1; x1) = 0; 8x1 2 R n  (46)
Managersexpected probability of being retained. A manager knows that he
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is retained if b > . He also knows (45) and (46), from which he can conclude that
b >   if (v1 = 2; x1 = 1 + q) or (v1 =  2; x1 =  1  q)
or (v1 = 1; x1 = 1  q) or (v1 =  1; x1 =  1 + q) (47)b <  otherwise (48)
Given (47) and (48), a manager of type i can easily compute the probability of being
retained when trading order x1. In particular, since a good manager observes v1; he
knows that:
Pr(b > jx1; v1) =  1 if x1 = X1;g(v1)0 if x1 6= X1;g(v1) (49)
A bad manager does not observe v1. Therefore, in his case we have that
Pr(b > jx1) =  14 if x1 = f 1  q; 1 + q; 1  q; 1 + qg0 otherwise (50)
Good managersstrategy in the rst round of trade.29 Let me dene the
total prots that a good manager expects from trading order x1at the beginning of
s = 1 (when he observes v1) as follows:
etot;g(x1; v1) = 
e
1;g (x1; v1) + Pr(
b > jx1; v1)2;g (51)
where:
e1;g (x1; v1) = R
e
1;g (x1; v1) +  = x1 [v1   P e1 (x1)] + 
are the prots that the good manager expects to get in the rst round of trade from
trade x1. Pr(b > jx1; v1) is the probability of being retained if trading x1. 2;g are
the equilibrium prots that the good manager expects to gain in the second round
if he is retained (these are the prots expected at the beginning of s = 1 when
the manager does not know v2 yet). We know that the average equilibrium return







In order to show that X1;g() is the equilibrium strategy, I have to show that when
the true state is observed to be v1; order X1;q;g(v1) maximizes (51). Again, given the
29Remember that I am assuming that the type of manager does not change over the two rounds
of trades.
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symmetry of the problem, it is su¢ cient to focus only on the cases in which the good
manager observes v1 = 1; 2 and only on the buy side of the problem (i.e. positive
orders). Using this fact and expression (51), our task amounts to show that:
for v1 = 1; 2 and 8x1  0; etot;g(X1;g(v1); v1)  etot;g(x1; v1) (52)


























+ 2 if v1 = 2
I will proof (52) by considering the following three cases:
a) When the good manager observes v1 = 1; 2, he will follow the equilibrium
strategy and play X1;g(v1) instead of refraining from trading. Formally:
for v1 = 1; 2; etot;g
 
X1;g(v1); v1
  etot;g (0; v1) (53)























+   0 (55)
It is apparent that inequalities (54) and (55) are always satised in our parameters
region.
b) When the good manager observes v1 = 1; 2, he is better o¤ playing X1;g(v1)
instead of either deviating to any other order that could in principle arise in equilib-








  etot;g  X1;g(1); 2 (57)
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+    1
4










+   (1  q)

2  






Inequality (58) is clearly always satised in our parameters region. Since  > 0, a


















which is satised as long as:
q  2 +    2
2
2(12  7)
Notice that for every value of  2 (0; 1), the RHS of the previous inequality is lower
than 2
5
and thus the previous condition is weaker than condition (43) and can be
ignored.
c) Finally, when the good manager observes v1 = 1; 2, he is better o¤ playing
X1;q;g(v1) instead of deviating to any positive order o¤ the equilibrium path.
Formally, let x1 2 Rnf1 + q, 1  qg. Then, it must be that:
for v1 = 1; 2; etot;g
 
X1;g(v1); v1
  etot;g (x1; v1)
Focusing on the buy side of the problem, we have to consider the two separated cases
in which x1 2 (0; 2) and x1  2.
x1 2. Given market makersrst-round price strategy for out of equilibrium
aggregate orders (12), we have that P e1 (x1) = 2 and thus:
E(1;g (x1) jv1) = x1 [v1   P e1 (x1)] +  = x1 [v1   2] + 
Furthermore, given (49), it is also true that for v1 = 1; 2, Pr(b > jx1; v1) = 0. Thus,
total expected prots from deviating to any x1  2 are equal to x1 [v1   2] + .
Notice that x1 [v1   2]  0 (remember that we are focusing on v1 = 1; 2). Therefore,
deviations to any x1  2 are (weakly) dominated by the choice of not trading, which
we have shown to be non optimal.
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x 2 (0; 2). Again, given (12) we can compute:
P e1 (x1) =
1
2
P1(x1 + 1) +
1
2





2(x1   1) = x1
and accordingly
E(1;g (x1) jv1) = x [v1   P e1 (x1)] +  = x1 (v1   x1) + 
Again, given (49), we have that for v1 = 1; 2, Pr(b > jx; v1) = 0. Thus, when
the true value of the asset is observed to be v1 = 1, the total expected prots from
deviating to any x1 2 (0; 2) are equal to:
E(1;g (x1) jv1 = 1) = x1 [1  x1] + 
On the other hand, when the true vale of the asset is observed to be v1 = 2, the total
expected prots from deviating to any x1 2 (0; 2) are equal to
E(1;g (x1) jv1 = 2) = x1 [2  x1] + 






















+ 2  x1 [2  x1] + 
and are always satised in our parameters region (remember that here we are focusing
on x1 2 (0; 2)).
Bad managersstrategy in the rst round of trade. A bad manager does
not observe v1. Accordingly, let me dene the total prots that he expects from
trading order x1at the beginning of s = 1 as follows:
etot;b(x1) = 
e
1;g (x1) + Pr(
b > jx1)2;b
where
e1;b (x1) = R
e
1;b (x1) +  =  x1P e1 (x1) + 
are the prots that the good manager expects to get in the rst round of trade from
trade x1. Pr(b > jx1) is the probability of being retained if trading x1. 2;g are
the equilibrium prots that the good manager expects to gain in the second round
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if he is retained. Since a bad manager does not trade in the second round, 2;b = .
Thus, we can write:




In order to show that the mixed strategy X1;b is an equilibrium strategy, we have
to show that 8x1  0 the following condition holds:
etot;b(X

1;b)  etot;b(x1) (61)





















I will prove (61) by considering the following di¤erent cases:
a) Playing X1;b is better than deviating to any other order that is consistent with















tot;b(1  q) = etot;b( 1 + q)
In fact the bad manager is indi¤erent between X1;b and playing either the pure
strategy 1  q or  1+ q. It is also trivial to show that etot;b(1 + q) = etot;b( 1  q).
Therefore, we just have to check that
etot;b(X

1;b)  etot;b(1 + q)















(1 + q) (63)
It is immediate to check that (63) is always satised in our parameters region. Notice
that the bad manager prefers X1;b to any other mixed strategy X1;b that randomizes
over f1 + q, 1  q,   1 + q,   1  qg. Indeed, notice that the expected payo¤of any
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mixed strategy X1;b is a convex combination of etot;b(1  q) and etot;b(1 + q). That
is,
etot;b (X1;b) = h
e
tot;b(1  q) + (1  h)etot;b(1 + q); with h 2 [0; 1]









etot;b(1  q), it immediately follows that etot;b(X1;b) > etot;b(X1;b):


















  (1  q) 
2
2   (64)
c)X1;b is better than deviating to any order o¤ the equilibrium path. Let x1 2
R+ r f 1  q,  1 + q, 0, 1 + q, 1  qg and consider the two following cases:
x1 2: Given (12), P e(x1) = 2. Given ((50), Pr(b > jx1) = 0. Thus:
etot;b(x1) =  2x1 + 
Notice that  2x1 < 0. Therefore, deviations to x1  2 are strictly dominated by
the choice of not trading, which we have just shown to be non optimal.
x 2 (0; 2). In this case P e(x1) = x1 and Pr(b > jx1) = 0. Thus:
etot;b(x1) =  x21 + 
Again,  x21 < 0 and consequently also deviations to x1 2 (0; 2) are strictly domi-
nated by the choice of not trading. Thus, a bad managers will never deviate to out
of equilibrium orders.
We can then conclude that under condition (64), X1;q;b is the equilibrium rst-
round strategy of the bad managers.
Therefore, we have that good an bad managers follow their equilibrium strategies





 q < 2
3
  (1  q) 
2
2  
This implies that a su¢ cient condition on , expressed in terms of the parameters
of the game, can be written as follows:
  3
2
5 (2  ) (65)
Market makersstrategy in the rst round of trade. Given bad and good
managersequilibrium strategies (9) and (8), aggregate order Z1(u; v; i) satises:
Z1(u; v; i) =
8>><>>:
2 + q if fu = 1; v = 2; i = gg
2  q if fu = 1; v = 1; i = gg or fu = 1; i = b with x1;b = 1  qg
q if fu =  1; v = 2; i = gg or fu = 1; v =  1; i = gg
or fu = 1; i = b with x1;b =  1 + qg
Z1(u; v; i) =  Z1( u; v; i)
Focus on positive aggregate orders. When a market maker observes z1 = 2 + q
he immediately infers that the good type is trading and that the value of the asset
is v1 = 2. When he observes z1 = 2  q, he updates the distribution of v1 as follows:
Pr(v = 2j2  q) = Pr(v =  1j2  q) = Pr(v =  2j2  q) = 1  
2(2  )
Pr(v = 1j2  q) =  + 1
2(2  )
and accordingly sets P (2   q)  E(vj2   q) = 
2  . Analogously, when he observes
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z1 = q, he computes:
Pr(v = 2jq) = 1
4
(1 + )
Pr(v = 1jq) = 1
4
(1  )
Pr(v =  1jq) = 1
4
(1 + )
Pr(v =  2jq) = 1
4
(1  )
and sets P (q)  E(vjq) = 
2
. Therefore, for the set of positive aggregate orders that
can arise in equilibrium, we obtain the following market makers price strategy:
P1(z1) =
8<:
2 if z1 = 2 + q

2  if z1 = 2  q

2
if z1 = q
Following the same logic, it is easy to show that for negative aggregate orders
z1 =  q; 2 + q; 2  q we have that
P1(z1) =  P1( z1)
This proves that for equilibrium aggregate orders, the price strategy of the market
maker is indeed given by (10).
In order to complete the construction of the price function in the candidate equi-
librium q, we need to construct the price schedule according to which the market
maker sets prices in response to out of equilibrium aggregate orders. In this respect,
market makers out of equilibrium beliefs about information content of trade are
crucial. It is important to notice that in the present game, PBE does not imply any
restriction on market makers out of equilibrium beliefs. Thus, the market makers
price response to any out of equilibrium order can be every price belonging to [ 2; 2].
Accordingly, I arbitrarily assume that market makers price out of equilibrium aggre-
gate orders according to (12).
Investors decision at the beginning of the rst round. An investor is
completely uninformed about the liquidation value of the asset. He has to decide
whether to delegate trade to a fund manager or stay out of the market. Suppose
the investor chooses to hire a manager. With probability  he hires a good manager.
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(1 + q) [2  P e1 (1 + q)] +
1
4




( 1 + q) [ 1  P e1 ( 1 + q)] +
1
4
































On the other hand, with probability 1    the investor hires a bad manager. The








































Thus, the equilibrium average return from delegation expected by the investor in the
rst round is equal to














and the equilibrium payo¤ that the investor expects from the average manager in







Since the investor has the option of staying out of the market, he will hire a manager
at the beginning of the rst round of trade if and only if the payo¤ of delegation is
positive. This is guaranteed when
















Thus, condition (67) is weaker than condition (44), and can then be ignored.
Summing up, the relevant conditions on  are represented by (44) and (65), which
can be written as:
32









. It is easy to show that this inequality is guaranteed as long as the following




Notice that the RHS of the previous condition is positive and less than 1 for every
value of  2 (0; 1), which guarantees that  takes values in its proper range (0; 1).
Proof of proposition 4. I will prove only part a) of the proposition, since the




Second round of trade. The last round of the trade game described in section
4 is equivalent to that of the trade game described in section 3.2. Hence, by following

























when v2 = 2
when v2 = 1
X2;g( v2) =  X2;g(v2)
and bad managers do not trade, as prescribed by proposition 3.30
30Note that for  = 0, both the good and the bad manager would in fact be indi¤erent about
any trading strategy in the last round. Indeed, in the last round of trade, good and bad managers
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Investors retaining rule at the end of the rst round of trade and
investorsbelief b. By following the arguments in the proof of proposition 3, it is
easy to show that the investor retains the incumbent manager as long as b > , withb given by (45) and (46).
First round of trade. In the rst round of trade, aggregate order for the asset
reads:
Z(u1; v1; i) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2 + q when fu1 = 1; v1 = 2; i = gg
2  q when fu1 = 1; v1 = 1; i = gg
or fu1 = 1; i = b with x1;b = 1  q g
q when fu1 =  1; v1 = 2; i = gg
or fu1 = 1; v1 =  1; i = gg
or fu1 = 1; i = b with x1;b =  1 + q g
By following the usual reasoning (see proof of proposition 3), it is easy to show
that given bad and good managersequilibrium strategies in the rst round, market
makers pricing strategy in the rst round of trade is described by the odd function
P1(z1) =  P1( z1), with
P1(z1) =
8<:
2 z1 = 2 + q
1 2w





As for the out of equilibrium aggregate orders, we assume that the market makers
pricing strategy is the usual one, that is:
P1(z1) =
8<:
2 z1  1; z1 6= 2  q; 2 + q
2z1   1  z1  1; z1 6=  q; q
 2 z1   1; z1 6=  2  q; 2 + q
(71)
expected prots from placing order x2 read respectively:
E(2;g(x2)jv2) = Re2;g (x2) +  = x2 [v2   P e2 (x2)] + 
E(2;b(x2)) = R
e
2;b (x2) +  =  x2P e2 (x2) + 
Therefore, for  = 0 , any order x2 delivers the same prot , both to good and bad managers.
However, it also true that for any positive (whatever small) , the good manager follows X2;G(v)
and the bad manager does not trade. The case  ! 0+ is meant to represent this situation in
which the good managers indi¤erence is broken in favour of the strategy that maximizes investors
expected return (From a technical point of view, notice that both E(2;g(x2)jv2) and E(2;g(x2))
are continuous in  2 (0; 1)).
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Before going on, notice that given this market makers pricing strategy, we can
compute the prices expected by a manager when he places equilibrium orders 1 + q,
1  q,  1 + q and  1  q:














Good managersstrategy in the rst round. Proposition 4 prescribes that





when v1 = 2
when v1 = 1
X1;g( v1) =  X1;g(v1)
Let good managers total expected prots from order x1 at the beginning of the rst
round be given by:
etot;g(x1; v1) = 
e
1;g(x1; v1) + Pr
b > jx1; v12;g
For ! 0+, order x1 does not a¤ect good managers payo¤directly, ande1;g(x1; v1) =




b > jx1; v1i 
In order to show that X1;g(v1) is optimal for the good manager in the rst round, we
have to show that for every v1 =  2; 1; 1; 2 and every x1 2 R, the following holds
true: h
1 + Pr
b > jX1;g(v1); v1i   h1 + Prb > jx1; v1i 
Given investors beliefs (45) and (46), for a good manager it is true that:
Pr(b > jx1; v1) =  1 if x1 = X1;g(v1)0 if x1 6= X1;g(v1)
Thus, the optimality condition for X1;g(v1) is always trivially satised as long as
 > 0.
In the present context, it important to note that since ! 0+, the specic order
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placed by a good manager does not a¤ect his payo¤ directly, and good managers
and investors incentives are not obviously aligned. Order x1 a¤ects the payo¤ by
a¤ecting good managers probability of being retained. As we know, this probability
crucially depends on investors beliefs about the strategy that a good manager follows
in equilibrium. Here, we are (reasonably) focusing on the class of equilibria in which
the investor conjectures that in equilibrium good managers do follow the strategy
that maximizes the expected return from trade, X1;g (v1).
Remark 6 For ! 0+, the good manager follows his equilibrium strategies X1;g (v1)








Bad managersstrategy in the rst round. We know that in equilibrium the
bad managers does not trade in the second round. Furthermore, the bad manager
does not observe v1. Accordingly, we can write his total expected prots from order




b > jx1i 
In order to show that strategy X1;b of randomizing with equal probability over
1  q and  1 + q is the optimal strategy for the bad manager in the rst round, we
have to show that for every x1 2 R, the following holds true:h
1 + Pr
b > jX1;bi   h1 + Prb > jx1i 
Again, given investorsbeliefs (45) and (46), we have that for a bad manager




  w if x1 = 1  q; 1 + q
w if x1 = 1 + q; 1  q
0 otherwise
and accordingly
Pr(b > jX1;b) = 12   w









b > jx1i 
The previous condition is always trivially satised for orders x1 6= 1+q, 1 q,  1+q,
50
 1  q, for which Pr(b > jx1) = 0.31 Let X+1;b denote a mixed strategy that consists
in randomizing over the equilibrium orders 1 + q and  1  q. In this case
Pr(b > jX+1;b) = w






which is always satised as long as  > 0 and w 2  0; 1
4

. Note that when w gets
greater than 1
4
, the bad manager has an incentive to deviate to from the equilibrium
mixed strategy X1;b to X
+
1;b. Hence, the conjecture at the base of part b) of propo-





there exist equilibria in which bad managers randomizes
over 1 + q and  1  q.
Remark 7 For ! 0+, the bad managers follows his mixed strategy of randomizing
over 1   q and  1 + q in the rst round and does not trade in the second round as
long as  > 0 and w 2  0; 1
4

The investors problem. An investor hires a fund manager at the beginning
of the rst round if the prots he expects to gain from delegating trade are higher
than those he would get by staying out of the market. When  ! 0+, the investor
nds it convenient to hire a fund manager in the rst round of trade as long as:



















































31Clearly, also any mixed strategy X1;b that randomizes over orders x1 2
Rn f1 + q, 1  q,   1 + q,   1  qg gives rise to Pr(b > jX1;b) = 0 and thus is dominated
by X1;b
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w   3w2 (72)









. Furthermore, it is easy
to compute that limw!0+ E (Re1) = 0
+, while for w = 1
4










Remark 8 When w 2  0; 1
4

and  ! 0+, for any   5
2
w   3w2 an investor nds
it convenient to hire a fund manager at the beginning of the rst round of trade.




w   3w2 2  0; 7
16

, we can safely
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